Novara in 1922, a working-class town against the fascists
il manifesto 21.4.2010
E il luglio del 1922, Novara. I fascisti sono alle porte, ci sono stati già scontri armati, morti, scorrerie, aggressioni. Novara è la chiave del triangolo industriale, sfondare qui significa per i fascisti avere le porte aperte per la conquista delle roccaforti operaie del triangolo industriale. “Vi fu in quel periodo una riunione alla Camera del Lavoro del Biellese”, racconta Alfonso Leonetti, che all’epoca era redattore dell’Ordine Nuovo: ma quando il rappresentante del partito comunista bordighiano si rese conto che era presente Giacinto Serrati, sospetto di riformismo, nonostante le insistenze degli altri partecipanti, se ne andò, “ciò che rese impossibile anche solo l’iniziare la discussione”. E intanto i fascisti avanzavano.
Cesare Bermani riporta questo documento nel suo La battaglia di Novara. 9-24 luglio 1922. L’ultima occasione di una riscossa antifascista, ripubblicato e ampliato ora da Derive Approdi (347 pagg., 22 euro). E’ il racconto minuziosamente documentato della (poco conosciuta) popular resistance in the province of Novara red fascist aggression, and as a result, divisions, blindness, compromises, failures of the left political forces contributed to this defeat, even decisive at the national level. The episode recounted by Leonetti is an example. But in the conclusions, Berman insists above all on the responsibilities of the reformist parties who are convinced as ever that "the opposition is in parliament and not in the country, divided the Alliance of Labour and they suspend the general strike declared in Lombardy and Piedmont bank to make the aggression of the fascist squads. Fallen strike, divided workers, opened the way for the fascists Novara, the victory over the North, and the March on Rome.
The responsibility for this outcome, writes Bermani, then falls on those political forces that divided the people's resistance and did not realize that the only way to stop the fascists was to fight from below. Now, as Bermani writes in the introduction, there is no history with the "if", and it is said that the fight from the bottom could really prevent the Fascist victory in Italy - but the fact is that it was not proven, or at least not to the end. In a sense, the battle of Novara evokes what has been called "ucronia": a narrative that the story would have been different, and if this did not happen was due from us. The ucronia, in short, is a way to tell us and other makers of history, to assert our leadership and our responsibility and our mistakes. And perhaps alluding to the risk of repeating this. As always in practice
historiographical Berman, a strong interpretive thesis does not, in fact reinforces, a documentary and narrative practice scrupulous exactitude the limits of a welcome. The original documents - archive, news source, and oral sources (including a clever use of sources fascist) - are reported with unusual breadth, supported by abundant notes, and twisted almost into a montage of film. If I were to say that the book more like him, I would say the short summer of anarchy by Hans Magnus Enzensberger, a montage of sources that the author connects them "as when a child was passed by opening water channels from one puddle to another." Less than literary and documentary, The Battle of Novara may seem hard to read, until one refuses to be lost in the game of languages: the fascist rhetoric of hyperbole and inflated superlatives, its echoes even in the anti-fascist press time, the concreteness daily oral sources and the passion of the dialect reported engaging with philological precision.
One of the top of the book is the long narrative of Fenis Baldini, who was going dancing with friends when he was in the midst of battle. It is worth paying tribute to this woman, militant proletariat, which (through the records Bermani Cesare in the 60s) we have a lot of political songs then entered into the movement of folk song and in our common memory is made by people like her bone of the worker and the culture of resistance in our country (we can hear his voice now a more valuable work in recent Bermani Caesar, come May. Canto social, tales of magic and memories of struggle in the first half of the twentieth century in Lower Novarese, Novara, Spacing, 2009, with two CDs of original recordings).
As always, linguaggio veicola il senso profondo degli avvenimenti narrati, lo sato d’animo di chi li vive e li racconta. Il resoconto fascista di una scorreria contro il paese di Recetto: “Senza colpo ferire rimaniamo padroni assoluti della posizione…” E’ il linguaggio militare, che domina queste narrazioni di gesta. A fine giornata, le squadre fasciste “dopo tredici ora di lavoro, di assalti, senza posa e senza cibo, vittoriose, con i cimeli di guerra, esauste per la fatica, ma non per lo spirito, ritornano cantando i loro inni all’accampamento di Borgo Vercelli…” Sembra di sentire gli echi del famoso comunicato della vittoria di Armando Diaz. E infatti: stiamo raccontando uno scontro politico, o stiamo raccontando una guerra? Non è tanto il dato materiale dei morti (otto antifascisti, tre fascisti), quanto lo spirito implicito nel linguaggio dei vivi a suggerire che davvero a Novara in quei giorni, e forse non solo lì, ci si sentiva come nel pieno di una vera e propria guerra civile, in cui l’obiettivo era l’annientamento dell’altro da un lato, e la sopravvivenza per lottare ancora dall’altro.
Tempo fa, raccontandomi un sanguinoso sciopero, la violenza padronale e la resistenza sindacale, un operaio di Detroit mi diceva: “non fu una passeggiata di pistoleri” – anche i lavoratori risposero a tono a chi gli sparava addosso. Scrivendo di Novara, ancora nella sua fase antifascista, Giampaolo Pansa spoke of "a walk, even violent" as saying that the only players on the scene were the Fascists, and the opposition or not there was or not hampered them too much. Raccntando detail a myriad of events of those days, Berman shows us that no, it was by no means a walk of gunslingers: to take Novara and its province, the fascists had to face a combative working class, often armed, far from being submissive and resigned. The "walk" was after, and it was called March on Rome, but to open the way it was (too?) The abandonment of the struggle from below that experienced in Novara one of his finest moments, and not told.
Friday, April 23, 2010
Saturday, April 10, 2010
Littlest Pet Shop Advent
on mine Mountcoal
il msnifesto 9 aprile 2010
Mercoledì scorso il corrispondente da New York di Radio 24 apriva la sua rubrica con la notizia del disastro minerario nella miniera della Massey Energy a Mountc oal, West Virginia, in cui sono morti almeno 25 minatori. La cosa è molto encomiabile: basta pensare che gli ha dato la precedenza anche rispetto alle novità di Obama sulla limitazione delle armi nucleari. Ma era più problematico il commento, basato sul paradosso fra queste tragedie apparentemente arcaiche e la moderna, tecnologica America - come se l’idea stessa della miniera di carbone rinviasse automaticamente a un passato premoderno di pala e piccone.
Questa è una modalità tipica dei media italiani, spectacularized that the United States as a country of extremes and contrasts, great wealth and great poverty, and extreme modernity surprising backwardness. In fact, mining is now a technologically advanced sector, and mine is an Mountcoal esmepio - with its continuous miner, the giant machine toothed rotary digging tunnels rip coal, chew and spit them out again on the belt transmission, and its intricate tracks, cables, wires, trucks moving. Several recent tragedies have their own specific outcomes of this modernity: the continuous miner generates an unusual amount of dust that is cemented in the lungs of miners who, in modern times tecnologica, crepano di pneumoconiosi più di prima, e per di più è altamente esplosiva (una delle violazioni della sicurezza rilevate a Mountcoal riguardava proprio il mancato controllo delle polveri).
Anche questo viene reso meno percepibile dalla spettacolarizzazione mediatica sull’eccezionalità di ciascuna singola tragedia (“la più grave dell’ultimo quarto di secolo”). Si tratta piuttosto di tragedie ordinarie, che si ripetono con modalità quasi invariate ogni anno. I “disastri” (definizione ufficiale: un incidente con almeno cinque vittime) fanno notizia, ma la stragrande maggioranza delle morti in miniera avviene al disotto di questo radar, per crolli (spesso provocati – like last year in Utah - greed to pull up to the last gram of carbon), shorts, mobile equipment investment, and so on. Apart from the hundreds who die at home, on average three a day, with the lungs of carbon blacks. Death in the mines is not exceptional, but systematic: a mass disaster like this one is no exception, but an 'acceleration of the rule.
today when a mine explodes or collapses, the government launches new safety standards, and after each disaster, we read that the company had been caught hundreds of times in violation. At this point, the responsibility extends to the institutions: what conclusions should be drawn supervisory bodies in front of a systematic violation of such laws? what 'is the cost of these fines (and agrees to pay to go forward, even as in many cases, including Mountcoal, not paying at all)?; or inspections serve only to bureaucrats to say "we told you so", and wash their hands? Pass laws and should not be applied or not is a form of complicity?
Some newspapers have reported the cynical master of Mountcoal Memorandum, Don Blankenship: "whenever you are asked to do different jobs dall'estrarre coal (ie, work to secure the mine) ignore them. Remember that the coal pays the bills. " Don Blankenship is not any greedy master is a real octopus in your pocket all the institutions and politicians of West Virginia, and no institution will jump to mind from interfering with his business. His company, Massey was able to get rid of the union, with any kind of practice - shooting at the miners during the strike of 1984-85, and resorting to blackmail, tips, bullying and pressure to induce its workers to give up Montocoal union protection. A newly published book - Coal River by Michael Shnayerson - has an entire chapter devoted to its anti-union practices at the mine Montcoal. It is not a local issue and marginal: the disappearance of the union has led to the transfer of West Virginia from the field to the democratic republican, which was decisive in the first election of George Bush - who thanked him by putting a coal industry lobbyist at the helm of the institution's oversight of mine safety.
However, even if there was not that the union would interfere too much: worried about the jobs of its members (the West Virginia has lost six hundred thousand jobs in the mines since 1960, a population of less than two million ) and shares that pay the union coffers, the UMW has always supported the interests and profits of the mining industry even at the expense of safety (when an explosion killed 79 miners in Fairmont, West Virginia, in 1969, the union president praised the company and said that yes, certain things is to be expected, working in the mine is dangerous).
The subordination of the union invests another aspect of energy and environmental policy: the mountaiontop removal, coal mining, but not digging tunnels by blasting the tops of the mountains until leaving to found the vein, spilling contaminated soil in the valleys and rivers. Questga In practice, Blankenship and Massey are in the forefront, so that its Blankenship argued topic in discussion with Robert Kennedy, Jr. at the University of West Virginia, saying the mountain top removal is essential Employment and the 'energy independence of the United States. The environmental groups and local people have highlighted the appalling damage of this practice: the damage climate change, environmental destruction (in 2000, another mine at Massey's Blankenship, exile poisonous sludge 1.16 billion, thirty times more from the Exxon Valdez oil disaster, which poisoned the land and rivers through the Southeast United States), the dangers to the surrounding population, the fact that the top mountai removal takes up much less traditional mining workforce. But the union - almsgiving dazzled a few jobs - supports the claims of Blankenship, including to pave the historic Blair Mountain, site of pitched battle in 1922 where during a pitched battle between miners and private armies of the companies the strikers even intervened to bomb the U.S. Air Force. The disaster
Mountcoal not improve the image of Massey - but it is not that call into question the power. Don Blankenship is perfectly capable of saying that the tragedy in the tunnel shows that the mountain top removal is less dangerous (for people who work there, certainly not for those who live around), and use it to speed up the concessions that must be asked throughout the state. Sign for certain powers, not all silver lining.
il msnifesto 9 aprile 2010
Mercoledì scorso il corrispondente da New York di Radio 24 apriva la sua rubrica con la notizia del disastro minerario nella miniera della Massey Energy a Mountc oal, West Virginia, in cui sono morti almeno 25 minatori. La cosa è molto encomiabile: basta pensare che gli ha dato la precedenza anche rispetto alle novità di Obama sulla limitazione delle armi nucleari. Ma era più problematico il commento, basato sul paradosso fra queste tragedie apparentemente arcaiche e la moderna, tecnologica America - come se l’idea stessa della miniera di carbone rinviasse automaticamente a un passato premoderno di pala e piccone.
Questa è una modalità tipica dei media italiani, spectacularized that the United States as a country of extremes and contrasts, great wealth and great poverty, and extreme modernity surprising backwardness. In fact, mining is now a technologically advanced sector, and mine is an Mountcoal esmepio - with its continuous miner, the giant machine toothed rotary digging tunnels rip coal, chew and spit them out again on the belt transmission, and its intricate tracks, cables, wires, trucks moving. Several recent tragedies have their own specific outcomes of this modernity: the continuous miner generates an unusual amount of dust that is cemented in the lungs of miners who, in modern times tecnologica, crepano di pneumoconiosi più di prima, e per di più è altamente esplosiva (una delle violazioni della sicurezza rilevate a Mountcoal riguardava proprio il mancato controllo delle polveri).
Anche questo viene reso meno percepibile dalla spettacolarizzazione mediatica sull’eccezionalità di ciascuna singola tragedia (“la più grave dell’ultimo quarto di secolo”). Si tratta piuttosto di tragedie ordinarie, che si ripetono con modalità quasi invariate ogni anno. I “disastri” (definizione ufficiale: un incidente con almeno cinque vittime) fanno notizia, ma la stragrande maggioranza delle morti in miniera avviene al disotto di questo radar, per crolli (spesso provocati – like last year in Utah - greed to pull up to the last gram of carbon), shorts, mobile equipment investment, and so on. Apart from the hundreds who die at home, on average three a day, with the lungs of carbon blacks. Death in the mines is not exceptional, but systematic: a mass disaster like this one is no exception, but an 'acceleration of the rule.
today when a mine explodes or collapses, the government launches new safety standards, and after each disaster, we read that the company had been caught hundreds of times in violation. At this point, the responsibility extends to the institutions: what conclusions should be drawn supervisory bodies in front of a systematic violation of such laws? what 'is the cost of these fines (and agrees to pay to go forward, even as in many cases, including Mountcoal, not paying at all)?; or inspections serve only to bureaucrats to say "we told you so", and wash their hands? Pass laws and should not be applied or not is a form of complicity?
Some newspapers have reported the cynical master of Mountcoal Memorandum, Don Blankenship: "whenever you are asked to do different jobs dall'estrarre coal (ie, work to secure the mine) ignore them. Remember that the coal pays the bills. " Don Blankenship is not any greedy master is a real octopus in your pocket all the institutions and politicians of West Virginia, and no institution will jump to mind from interfering with his business. His company, Massey was able to get rid of the union, with any kind of practice - shooting at the miners during the strike of 1984-85, and resorting to blackmail, tips, bullying and pressure to induce its workers to give up Montocoal union protection. A newly published book - Coal River by Michael Shnayerson - has an entire chapter devoted to its anti-union practices at the mine Montcoal. It is not a local issue and marginal: the disappearance of the union has led to the transfer of West Virginia from the field to the democratic republican, which was decisive in the first election of George Bush - who thanked him by putting a coal industry lobbyist at the helm of the institution's oversight of mine safety.
However, even if there was not that the union would interfere too much: worried about the jobs of its members (the West Virginia has lost six hundred thousand jobs in the mines since 1960, a population of less than two million ) and shares that pay the union coffers, the UMW has always supported the interests and profits of the mining industry even at the expense of safety (when an explosion killed 79 miners in Fairmont, West Virginia, in 1969, the union president praised the company and said that yes, certain things is to be expected, working in the mine is dangerous).
The subordination of the union invests another aspect of energy and environmental policy: the mountaiontop removal, coal mining, but not digging tunnels by blasting the tops of the mountains until leaving to found the vein, spilling contaminated soil in the valleys and rivers. Questga In practice, Blankenship and Massey are in the forefront, so that its Blankenship argued topic in discussion with Robert Kennedy, Jr. at the University of West Virginia, saying the mountain top removal is essential Employment and the 'energy independence of the United States. The environmental groups and local people have highlighted the appalling damage of this practice: the damage climate change, environmental destruction (in 2000, another mine at Massey's Blankenship, exile poisonous sludge 1.16 billion, thirty times more from the Exxon Valdez oil disaster, which poisoned the land and rivers through the Southeast United States), the dangers to the surrounding population, the fact that the top mountai removal takes up much less traditional mining workforce. But the union - almsgiving dazzled a few jobs - supports the claims of Blankenship, including to pave the historic Blair Mountain, site of pitched battle in 1922 where during a pitched battle between miners and private armies of the companies the strikers even intervened to bomb the U.S. Air Force. The disaster
Mountcoal not improve the image of Massey - but it is not that call into question the power. Don Blankenship is perfectly capable of saying that the tragedy in the tunnel shows that the mountain top removal is less dangerous (for people who work there, certainly not for those who live around), and use it to speed up the concessions that must be asked throughout the state. Sign for certain powers, not all silver lining.
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